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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
problems which face the courts in deciding cases under section
1983. The statute for all practical purposes is overly broad. In
response to this, the courts have given the section such restric-
tive interpretation as to render it ineffective. Only through a
redrafting of section 1983 or through additional definitive legis-
lation can an equitable balance be struck between the conflict-
ing policies of just compensation for those genuinely deprived
of protected rights and freedom from undue burdens on effi-
cient performance by public officials.
PATRICK R. GRIFFEN
Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess-Availability of Federal Remedies-Reputation as a
Protected Interest-In Paul v. Davis,' the United States Su-
preme Court considered whether a person's reputation was a
liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.2 In
holding that the scope of 42 U.S.C. section 19831 does not ex-
tend to defamation by a municipal police department, the
Court has significantly changed its approach to civil liberties
questions and has restricted the availability of federal forums
for the litigation of those questions. Paul v. Davis contradicts
many well established principles of civil liberties law. Numer-
ous weaknesses appear in the Court's discussion of (1) the rela-
tionship of state tort remedies to federal remedies, (2) the na-
ture of the interest in reputation, and (3) the source of the
rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. This article
will examine the Court's rationale and its implications.
Paul v. Davis arose when the police chiefs of the City of
Louisville, Kentucky, and surrounding Jefferson County dis-
tributed a flyer to local merchants containing the names and
1. 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
2. The Court also considered Mr. Davis's right of privacy, a question that will not
be dealt with here.
3. Section 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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photographs of those whom the police department considered
"active shoplifters" to enable the merchants to detect the pres-
ence of such persons in their stores. Edward Davis's picture was
included in the flyer because in the summer of 1971 he had
been arrested for shoplifting. Although at the time of the distri-
bution of the circular the action against him was still pending,
it was soon to be dismissed.
After the dismissal, Davis commenced an action under 42
U.S.C. section 1983, alleging that the distribution of the circu-
lars by the police chiefs violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Davis alleged that the circular injured
his liberty or property interest in his good name and that the
injury was inflicted under color of state law without notice and
an opportunity to be heard. The district court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that no right protected by the United
States Constitution was asserted. On appeal the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,4 holding that
the Supreme Court's previous decision in Wisconsin v.
Constantineau5 made a person's reputation a constitutionally
protected interest, the violation of which would result in a sec-
tion 1983 action. The United States Supreme Court disagreed
and reaffirmed the district court.
In the majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, the
Court held that the scope of section 1983 must be viewed in
light of state tort law. The Court stated that the availability
of a state remedy is a significant consideration in determining
whether the plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to liti-
gate his claim in federal court. But, as the dissent pointed out,6
the availability of a state remedy had previously been consid-
ered irrelevant in determining whether a claim might be
brought under section 1983. This was the long standing man-
date of Monroe v. Pape That decision recognized that the
enactors of section 1983 intended that the statute provide a
remedy for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights sup-
plemental to any remedy available to a litigant in a state
court.' By considering the availability of a state remedy, Paul
4. 505 F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1974).
5. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
6. Brennan, J., in which Marshall, J., joined, and in which White, J., joined in
part.
7. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
8. Id. at 183. See also, e.g., McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671-72
(1963).
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implicitly subverts the holding of Monroe.
The Court in Paul assumed that the federal remedy will
supplement an adequate state remedy without considering
whether one of the three long-recognized aims of that statute
are present. As set out in Monroe, those three aims include:9
(1) providing a remedy when state law infringes upon a person's
constitutional rights, (2) providing a remedy when state law is
inadequate to protect constitutional rights, and (3) providing
a remedy when there exists a state remedy in theory, unavaila-
ble in practice. Instead of focusing on whether Davis should be
afforded a federal forum because of the inadequacy of the state
remedy, the Paul Court merely mentioned that imputing crim-
inal behavior is actionable per se and then dropped the matter.
But an investigation of Davis's underlying claim reveals that
the Court's assumption that Davis's state remedy was ade-
quate is unreasonable. Davis actually had little chance of suc-
cess in a state court.
The imputation of criminal behavior is slander per se in
Kentucky."0 An allegation of slander per se has the effect of
dispensing with the need for the plaintiff to show that the
defendant acted with malice and that actual pecuniary damage
resulted." If, however, a prima facie defense of privilege is es-
tablished, the presumption disappears, and malice must be
proven if the defense is to be overcome.2
In Kentucky, a peace officer is privileged to make defama-
tory statements without malice and within the scope of his
official duties. 3 If the act of distribution of the flyers is within
those duties, malice must be proven before the plaintiff can
recover. Given the fact that the list of shoplifters was compiled
without any wrongful intent to include Davis, malice simply
did not exist. In addition, there are other privileges that argu-
ably could be asserted by the police chiefs. Communications
made in the interest of the public with a reasonable belief in
their truth and made without malice are conditionally privi-
9. 365 U.S. at 173-74.
10. Templin v. Cornelius, 232 Ky. 94, 22 S.W.2d 421 (1929).
11. Massengale v. Lester, 403 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Ky. 1966); Tucker v. Kilgore, 388
S.W.2d 112, 114 (Ky. 1964).
12. Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d at 114; see generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 552
(1957).
13. See Catron v. Jasper, 303 Ky. 598, 198 S.W.2d 322 (1946).
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leged.'4 Similarly, a conditional privilege exists for defamatory
communications made in good faith by one having an interest
or a duty to another person who has a corresponding interest
or duty.'" Davis had no effective remedy in state court. He
simply could not allege a claim that could overcome the privi-
leges assertable by the Kentucky police.
By stating that this is a typical defamation action except
that the act was that of a state officer,'" the majority implied
that the consequences are the same whether the actor is a state
officer or a private individual. In the Court's opinion, the mere
fact of the actor's status as a state official does not create the
opportunity to litigate in a federal forum. But such a statement
loses sight of the nature of section 1983. A person has a right
to a federal forum if he shows that he is deprived of a constitu-
tionally protected interest and that the deprivation occurred
under color of state law without due process of law. The
"under color of state law" provision imposes a requirement
that the act could not have been done except for the cloak of
state authority of the actor.'7 The state action requirement is
a distinct requirement for section 1983 actions. The Court's
statement cannot be interpreted to mean that an actor's offi-
cial status creates no right to litigate in a federal forum, for this
ignores the plain language of the statute. Thus, only if the act
has occurred as a result of that "official" status is a claim
cognizable under section 1983. By acting "under color of state
law," the police chiefs invoked the protections of those offices.
The Court may have meant merely that Davis's constitutional
rights are not to be enlarged by the status of the actor; but the
status of the actor should not limit the constitutional protec-
tion afforded the victim. This writer agrees with Justice Bren-
nan's anguished response in dissent that the majority has im-
posed on the first requirement for a section 1983 action, i.e.,
the deprivation of a substantive constitutional right, elements
of the second requirement, i.e., that the deprivation occur
"under color of state law."' 8
14. Weinstein v. Rhorer, 240 Ky. 679, 42 S.W.2d 892, 894-95 (1931); Annot., 29
A.L.R.3rd 961, 977-78 (1970).
15. See Wolff v. Benovitz, 301 Ky. 661, 192 S.W.2d 730, 733 (1945). For another
possible privilege see Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.060 (1974).
16. See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
18. 96 S. Ct. at 1158 n. 2. Justice Brennan discussed and rejected three possible
menaings of this argument. At one point he remarked:
1976]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The majority stated that no great harm is done to persons
in situations similar to Davis's by denying them access to the
federal courts. Closer inspection reveals that that assertion
lacks substance. Acts of state officers are treated differently
than those of private individuals and that difference may be
such as to deprive a person of an adequate remedy. The very
purpose of section 1983 was to provide a forum for precisely
these claims."9 Yet this purpose escapes the Court in its preoc-
cupation with the problem of the over-burdened federal courts.
Its reasoning ignores the fact that arbitrary and capricious acts
of state officers are very often protected by common law doc-
trines followed in many states.
The Court also addressed the limitations on the federal
remedy. It concluded that the procedural guarantees of the due
process clause were not meant to be a source of general federal
tort law. But this distinction between section 1983 actions and
tort actions further conflicts with Monroe. There the Court
stated that the actor need not ntend to deprive the victim of
a federal right.2" His act may be tortious at common law, or
only analogous to a tort, but in perpetrating it he must deprive
his victim of a constitutionally protected right. Section 1983 is
to "be read against the background of tort liability that makes
a man responsible for the natural consequences of his ac-
tions."' Thus, a person's liability under section 1983 for depri-
vation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in reputa-
tion under color of state law may be analogous to the tort
liability for libel, but the limitations on the federal liability are
not to be determined by tort theory. What is a cognizable sec-
tion 1983 claim is limited only by the "Constitution and
laws. 22 Tort concepts are not to be used to limit section 1983.
In short, it is difficult to believe that the Court seriously suggests. . . that there
is some anomaly in the distinction, for constitutional purposes, between tortious
conduct committed by a private citizen and the same conduct committed by
state officials under color of state law.
Id. at 1168.
19. See note 8 supra.
20. 365 U.S. at 187.
21. Id.
22. Bristow, Section 1983: An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 29 ARK. L. REV.
255 (1975); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J.
5 (1974). For various applications of these concepts see generally, Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1959); Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971); Madison v. Manter,
441 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1971); see also Comment, Edelman and Scheuer: The Relation-
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By holding that tort concepts are not to enlarge the scope of
section 1983, the Court merely inverted the reasoning without
changing the effect.
The majority stated that the Supreme Court has never rec-
ognized injury to one's reputation, of itself, as a protected in-
terest. But reputation has heretofore only been discussed in
conjunction with the liberty interest one has in remaining free
from certain stigmas that foreclose future employment oppor-
tunities or with a property right. The Court cited a number of
cases that have dealt with stigmatization as illustrations that
the Court has consistently refused to recognize an independent
liberty interest in one's good name. But that rule was actually
the holding of the Court in only one of four opinions cited.23
ship Between the Eleventh Amendment and Executive Immunity, 58 MARQ. L. Ray.
741 (1975).
23. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), decided the issue of whether
Congress could deny government employment to three persons without affording them
notice and a hearing as required by the due process clause. The Court held that future
government employment is a protected liberty interest. However, the Court did not
consider whether reputation, of itself, is constitutionally protected. The Court's pass-
ing reference to the effect of the congressional act on the plaintiff's good name is not
support for holding that reputation by itself is not a protected interest. Id. at 314.
Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) involved an admin-
istrative determination that certain organizations were "subversive." The case con-
tains six opinions expressing the views of eight sitting justices. Paul states that in that
case six justices held that reputation alone is not a protected interest. However, the
Paul majority misunderstood two of the opinions. Justice Douglas's concurring opinion
stated that the determinative issue was the loss of status and the consequential dam-
age to a property interest in receiving contributions resulting from the imputation of
subversion by the state. Id. at 175. This holding cannot be interpreted to exclude
reputation as a liberty interest. Similarly, the opinion of Justice Jackson (concurring),
which stated that an organization has no assertable interest in its reputation alone,
does not preclude his view that an individual has such a constitutionally protected
right. Id. at 186. Actually, the McGrath Court addressed this very issue in a decision
handed down the same day as McGrath. An equally divided Court refused to hear an
individual's petition alleging that the labeling of the organization of which she was a
member as "subversive" resulted in an injury to her reputation. Bailey v. Richardson,
341 U.S. 918 (1951) (per curiam).
The Paul Court also relied on Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), as prece-
dent for holding that reputation is an unprotected interest. But the Court ignored the
fact that the vague language of Wieman can be just as easily interpreted to support
the view that reputation is constitutionally protected. For example, compare the use
of Wieman by both the majority and the dissent in Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), also cited in Paul. There the majority cited Wieman to
support the view that reputation alone is not a protected interest (367 U.S. at 898),
while the dissent cited Wieman to support their view that it was (367 U.S. at 902).
Thus the Paul Court's statement that precedent existing at the time of Wisconsin
v. Constantineau demanded that the plaintiff must allege injury to another liberty or
a property interest, in addition to injury to reputation, is clearly misleading. Only the
very divided McElroy Court had so held.
19761
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
In fact, the decision of Wisconsin v. Constantineaul4 had
previously been considered precedent for the view that reputa-
tion was a protected interest." That case dealt with a Wiscon-
sin state "posting" law which allowed state officials to prohibit
liquor retailers from selling their stock to persons known to be
excessive drinkers. Violations of these laws resulted in fines. To
carry out the aims of the statute, the names and pictures of
abusers of alcohol, as determined by police officials, were
posted in the local stores and remained there for one year. The
plaintiff was one of the persons whose name and picture was
posted. The Court ruled that this procedure, which did not
provide an opportunity for the person whose name was posted
to challenge the classification, was a deprivation of a constitu-
tionally protected interest.
The Paul majority held that the real interest the Constan-
tineau Court sought to protect was the property interest of the
plaintiff to purchase alcohol. In Paul the Court conceded that
Ms. Constantineau's reputation was injured, but interpreted
the Constantineau decision to afford no constitutional pro-
tection to that interest. However, in Constantineau the Court
stated:
The only issue present here is whether the label or characteri-
zation given a person by "posting," though a mark of serious
illness to some, is to others such a stigma or badge of disgrace
that procedural due process requires notice and an opportun-
ity to be heard. We agree with the District Court that the
private interest is such that those requirements of procedural
due process must be met.2"
The Paul majority based its distinction on the following pas-
sage: "While [sic] a person's good name, reputation, honor or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing
to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential"
(emphasis in the original). 27 The majority maintained that the
Constantineau Court referred merely to the governmental dep-
rivation of the right to purchase alcohol. The rest of the para-
graph from which this quotation was taken leaves no doubt
24. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
25. See Lipp v. Board of Education, 470 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1972); Dale v.
Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 636 (2nd Cir. 1971).
26. 400 U.S. at 436.
27. 96 S. Ct. at 1164, citing 400 U.S. at 437.
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that the Constantineau Court was not discussing merely the
right to purchase liquor:
"Posting" under the Wisconsin Act may to some be merely
the mark of illness, to others it is a stigma, an official brand-
ing of a person. The label is a degrading one. Under the
Wisconsin Act, a resident of Hartford is given no process at
all. This appellee was not afforded a chance to defend herself.
She may have been the victim of an official's caprice. Only
when the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of an un-
savory label on a person are aired can oppressive results be
prevented .28
Nothing is said, either expressly or by implication, of a prop-
erty right to purchase liquor. Rather, the passage makes it clear
that the Court considered reputation of itself a protected inter-
est.
As a result of the Paul holding, an injury to one's reputation
must be tied to either a liberty interest in being free from the
foreclosure of employment opportunities by stigmatization or
a property interest before it is cognizable under section 1983.
The Court stated that the Board of Regents v. Roth" decision
is in accord. In contrast, the circuit court of appeals held that
Roth commanded the opposite result.31
In Roth, the plaintiff, a nontenured teacher at a Wisconsin
state university challenged the state's refusal to rehire him.
Roth alleged that his fourteenth amendment rights had been
violated when the university at which he taught did not afford
him a hearing after refusing to renew his one-year contract. The
Roth Court first addressed the teacher's interest in his reputa-
tion. Roth claimed that a state officer had made charges
against him that were defamatory. The Court concluded that
the act of terminating the teacher's employment at the expira-
tion of his contract was not in itself defamatory. But if some
charge had been made against his competency or integrity, the
Court felt that Roth should be afforded the protections of due
process .3 The Court here referred precisely to the interest a
person has in his good name. Moreover, this position follows
naturally from the Court's view that the term "liberty" in the
28. 400 U.S. at 437.
29. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
30. 505 F.2d at 1182-83.
31. 408 U.S. at 574; see Greenhill v. Pauley, 519 F.2d 5, 8 (8th Cir. 1975).
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fourteenth amendment must be given a broad definition.2
The Roth Court focused on a second liberty concept, hold-
ing that every state employee has an interest in his future
employment opportunities which is injured if the acts of a gov-
ernment official have an adverse effect on his chances of ob-
taining employment in the future. An employee must be af-
forded procedural safeguards before employment opportunities
are significantly reduced by action under color of state law. 3
Roth also discussed those property interests which require
due process. These interests, if not incorporated into the Bill
of Rights, are created by independent sources such as state law.
Where the property interest has so definite a character that the
claimant has an absolute entitlement to it, due process con-
cepts apply.3 The Court held that because Roth was not a
tenured professor, he did not possess such a property interest.
Indeed, the Court previously held that a tenured professor does
possess such a property interest in maintaining his future em-
ployment with the state." Thus the Court in Roth did not
imply that the interests that are constitutionally protected lib-
erty or property interests must be confined to similar factual
contexts. Rather, the Court emphasized the broad nature of
liberty and property rights and rejected pro forma distinc-
tions. 6 Courts must not look to the weight of the right sought
to be protected, but to the nature of that right and to what is
at stake if that right is not afforded protection. 37
But in Paul, the Court excluded reputation as a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest because it did not have the
weight of the liberty interests recognized in Constantineau and
Goss v. Lopez.38 Reputation is not a tangible right in the nature
of one's right to purchase alcohol or a student's right to contest
temporary school suspension. But the Court cannot equate
purely tangible interests with those which require constitu-
tional protection; to so equate them would be to deny constitu-
32. 408 U.S. at 572; cf., Lipp v. Board of Education, 470 F.2d at 805.
33. 408 U.S. at 574-75; see Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1105 (5th Cir. 1975);
compare Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 677 (2nd Cir. 1966), with Newcomber v.
Coleman, 323 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Conn. 1970).
34. 408 U.S. at 577; see McNeil v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 1973); Lipp v.
Board of Education, 470 F.2d at 805.
35. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
36. 408 U.S. at 572.
37. Id. at 571; see, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
38. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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tional protection to most liberty interests. In 1923 in Meyer v.
Nebraska, the Court delineated the concept of liberty:39
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized. . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.
Reputation is an intangible interest similar to those catalogued
by the Court in Meyer which relates to standing and assocation
in the community; it is the way one is perceived by others
which greatly affects the course of one's life. One who has been
labeled a criminal by his peers is not to be placed in a position
of trust or confidence. To cast doubt on a person's integrity or
good character is to limit the ways in which others will react
to him and how he in turn can react to them. Further, defama-
tion of a person, regardless of whether or not he is a civil em-
ployee, affects employment opportunities. 0 As a result of the
distribution of the circular, Davis's assignments as a photogra-
pher were limited. Had he sought other employment, he would
have been hampered by the stigmatization. If liberty is to be
given a broad definition, the consequences of the acts of the
police chiefs must be viewed as infringing on a privilege essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness.
The Paul majority briefly touched on the notion of property
interests by stating that since reputation is not guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights, the only other source from which Paul might
derive that interest is state law.41 Roth, however, held that
property interests are derived from sources other than state
law. The interest may be protected, for example, by federal
law.42
A major point of the dissent is the majority's disregard for
the presumption of innocence inherent in our judicial system.
The police chiefs labelled Paul a "criminal" without allowing
him an opportunity to contest that determination. This act was
39. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
40. See the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals discussion, 505 F.2d at 1183.
41. See note 34 supra.
42. 96 S. Ct. at 1169 n. 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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all the more injurious because it was done with the prestige,
authority, and power of a government position. Thus, the defa-
mation suffered by Paul was much more devastating than the
same defamation inflicted by a private individual.
Justice Brennan in his dissent compared the majority view
with Jenkins v. McKeithen.4 3 In that case a state agency deter-
mined whether a person was guilty of violating certain criminal
laws. The Court held that the acts of the agency so nearly
branded the claimant a criminal in the public eye that he
should have been afforded substantial procedural safeguards
before such a determination was made." In Jenkins the Court
implicitly recognized reputation as a protected interest by fo-
cusing on the sufficiency of process afforded. In Paul, where the
police officials engaged in essentially the same conduct, the
Court determined that the interest is not protected."
The Paul majority was obviously concerned with creating
limitations on access to federal courts. The majority twice re-
fers to the innumerable claims that would result if Davis is
granted a forum. A major motive for the Court's holding was
the underlying fear of an additional burden on the federal
courts. But the same fear of burdening the courts was also
raised after the Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape." In view
of the minimal additional burden on the courts that in fact
resulted from Monroe's expansive holding,4 7 it is highly un-
likely that Paul could have imposed any significant burden on
the courts.
The inadequacies of the Paul decision are both methodolog-
ical and substantive. The Court's analysis of the legal issues is
nothing more than an accumulation of tendentious distinctions
between cases such as Constantineau, Roth, and Joint Anti-
Fascist Committee v. McGrath," that more appropriately sup-
port the proposition that reputation deserves constitutional
protection. Paul contradicts the rules of many of those cases
and cites no affirmative precedent for its result. The court did
43. 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
44. Id. at 424-25.
45. 96 S. Ct. at 1166.
46. Justice Brennan thought the majority confused the sufficiency of the form of
due process allotted with whether the interest should be afforded due process. 96 S.
Ct. at 1173-74.
47. See 83 HARV. L. REw. 1352 (1970).
48. Id.
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not determine what makes reputation different from other lib-
erty interests, nor did it state how its violation of the presump-
tion of innocence differs from other such violations which have
been declared unconstitutional. Moreover, the obvious
importance of one's good reputation is simply ignored.49
The substantive inadequacy of Paul is the harm it does to
the concept of section 1983. Section 1983 was enacted to be the
procedural mechanism for litigating questions arising out of the
fourteenth amendment, and its purpose is to protect a person's
rights, privileges, and immunities without the restrictions of
other state remedies. The Court has emasculated section 1983
by imposing upon it the limitations of tort law and the necess-
ity of a particular relation to state remedies. Persons with legit-
imate claims such as Davis's are now left without a remedy or
an impartial forum.
GEORGE S. BARANKO
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Non-retrogressive
Reapportionment Plan Upheld-In the recent decision of
Beer v. United States' the plaintiffs, six city council members,2
on behalf of the City of New Orleans, sought a judgment from
the District Court for the District of Columbia declaring that
neither the intent nor the effect of a proposed plan for the
apportionment of the councilmanic districts, which had been
challenged twice by the Attorney General of the United States,3
would abridge the right to vote on account of color or race.4 A
49. See W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, Act IlI, Scene 3, Lines 155-60. Who steals my
purse steals trash. . . . But he that filches from me my good name [r]obs me of that
which not enriches him, [a]nd makes me poor indeed.
1. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined; Justice
White filed a dissenting opinion; Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Brennan joined. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision.
2. The action was brought by six of the seven incumbent councilmen.
3. The guidelines established by the Attorney General for the preclearance
procedure of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are contained in 28 C.F.R. § 51.1 et
seq. In order to prevent new forms of racial discrimination these guidelines require the
submission and subsequent approval by the Attorney General of all changes in a
jurisdiction's voting laws.
4. The action for declaratory judgment was brought under § 5 of the Voting Rights
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